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Abstract 
The platform—a business model that creates value by connecting groups of users—is increasingly 
popular in many industries. Extant papers largely assume that platforms dominate the pricing 
decision, whereas in practice, prices in business-to-business transactions are often determined by a 
bargaining process. We study how the relative bargaining power of business partners affects 
pricing and competition in a two-sided market. We compile a unique and comprehensive dataset 
using sales data from the US daily deal market and specify a structural model based on Nash 
bargaining solutions. We find that Groupon, the larger deal platform, has more price-bargaining 
power than LivingSocial and that larger and chain merchants have more bargaining power than 
smaller and independent merchants. The difference in bargaining power between different types of 
merchant, interestingly, is more substantial on LivingSocial than on Groupon. Therefore, the size 
of a platform has two faces: while a larger customer base helps attract merchants, the platform’s 
bargaining power may motivate some merchants to work with its smaller competitors, over which 
they have more influence on price setting. Our counterfactual results show that the allocation of 
price-bargaining power plays an important role in the daily deal markets and that merchants are 
significantly worse off if platforms have higher price-bargaining power during the negotiation. 
Furthermore, as it increases the bargaining power, LivingSocial would be able to boost its profits 
but lose its attraction in acquiring merchants. 
 
Keywords: business-to-business marketing, platform competition, two-sided market, price 
bargaining, daily deals, structural model  
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1 Introduction  
 “Winning companies can no longer just be great product companies; they have to be 
great product and platform companies that enable the contributions of others.” 
— Brad Smith, CEO of Intuit 
We typically think companies compete over products: “build a better mousetrap and the 
world will beat a path to your door.” However, this proverbial business strategy does not apply to 
the fast-growing stream of platform businesses which grow by connecting groups of customers. 
Platform companies such as Amazon, eBay, and Groupon had notable growth momentum and 
attracted much attention among researchers and practitioners. Numerous start-ups operate on the 
platform concept and even traditional companies are looking for ways to become platforms. 
Understanding the strategy for platform competition has become more important than ever. 
A platform business serves at least two groups of customers, often referred to as “sides”. A 
business is considered a platform if (a) its end-users exhibit network externalities (that is, the 
benefit to one side from using the platform increases with the size of other sides) and (b) the 
growth of the platform depends on the relative prices charged to all sides. While the strength of 
the network effect is largely an empirical question, the pricing strategy is a central topic for 
theoretical research on platform competition (e.g., Armstrong 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2003, 2006). 
Most of the literature assumes that platforms have full pricing discretion and make take-it-or-
leave-it offers to the sides. In practice, prices are sometimes determined by a bargaining process 
between the platform and one side of the market, when the side consists of business partners such 
as goods or service providers. After all, price bargaining is pervasive in business-to-business (B2B) 
contexts and the interactions between platforms and providers are no exception. An eye-catching 
example is that Amazon and Hachette, the fourth-largest publisher in the US, settled a much-
debated dispute in 2014 and signed a contract concerning pricing and profit margins for e-books.1  
                                                 
1 Streitfeld, David. “Amazon and Hachette Resolve Dispute”. New York Times, November 13, 2014. 
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Intuitively, the price-bargaining dynamics between platforms and their business partners are 
critical for understanding platform competition. Depending on its relative control over pricing, a 
goods or service provider may obtain different payoffs on different platforms, which naturally 
influences its choice of platform. Due to the network effect, the provider’s choices would in turn 
affect a platform’s appeal to consumers, and hence influence the platform’s competitiveness in the 
demand market. Bargaining thus makes it theoretically challenging to predict market outcomes, as 
the competition critically depends on the magnitude of platforms’ and providers’ bargaining power, 
the nature of consumer preferences, and the heterogeneity in providers. For precisely this reason, 
it is an interesting and important empirical question to examine how the bargaining power of 
platforms and providers affects pricing and the competition between platforms.  
In this paper, we empirically analyze the effect of price-bargaining power in a two-sided 
market. In particular, we allow both sides of the market to be heterogeneous and do not restrict 
them to one platform. We compile a unique and comprehensive dataset on the demand and supply 
in the US daily deal market, where deal platforms create value by connecting local merchants and 
consumers and offering daily assortments of discounted goods and services. Merchants use deal 
sites primarily to bring in potential consumers as well as generate revenue by selling deals. 
We choose this empirical setting for several reasons. First, the daily deal market is a 
representative platform business and price bargaining is an important element in transactions 
between platforms and merchants. Second, since the market is largely a duopoly competition 
between two deal sites—Groupon and LivingSocial, understanding merchants’ tradeoffs in their 
platform choices is relatively straightforward. Third, the daily assortment of deals provides much-
needed data variation in the number and variety of merchants within a short period of time, 
allowing model identification. Fourth, the daily deal business in 2014 had $3 billion in revenue in 
the US market alone and even more in developing economies, making it an important market to 
study in its own right.2 
This research setting poses two modeling challenges. First, the size of the consumer base for a 
deal platform is endogenously determined by the size and composition of the other side—the 
                                                 
2 IBISWorld. “Daily deals sites in the US: Market Research Report.” December 2014. 
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merchants. Furthermore, as pointed out in the platform literature, a consumer’s decision should 
condition on her expectation of the other side. Second, both platforms and merchants act 
strategically on price setting. Platforms do not have full pricing discretion, as we will show in 
Section 3.5, so merchants internalize their bargaining power in the decision to work with 
particular platforms.  
Taking those two challenges into account, we specify a two-stage structural model. In the 
first stage, deal platforms and merchants negotiate—through an independent bargaining process—
the price charged to consumers. Despite being prominent in B2B markets, price bargaining has 
only recently been examined empirically. We model the outcomes of the platform-merchant 
negotiations following the Nash bargaining solution pioneered by Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and 
further developed by Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012). The solution of this supply model specifies 
the prices that solve the Nash bargaining problem between a platform and a merchant, conditional 
on other observed prices.  
In the second stage, we examine consumers’ decisions of choosing platforms and deals given 
the prices determined in the first stage. A consumer first needs to decide which platform(s) to use. 
Conditional on that choice, she decides whether to buy a particular deal. We formulate that a 
consumer’s choice of a platform is consistent with her expectation of its value, which depends on 
(a) the number of deals offered, with a larger assortment potentially yielding a higher option value, 
and (b) the perceived quality of the deals. By this specification, we endogenize the network effect 
such that the size of the customer base depends on the quantity and quality of merchants. In 
contrast to many two-sided-market papers that simply specify the number of consumers as a 
function of the number of merchants, our approach explicitly takes the composition of the 
merchants into consideration.  
Our demand specification incorporates the heterogeneity of consumers’ price sensitivity, but 
the distribution of price elasticity needs to be estimated based on aggregate sales data rather than 
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on individual-level data that are hard to obtain on a large scale.3 To address this challenge, we 
cast our estimation using the “BLP” model—the random-coefficient aggregate discrete-choice 
model developed by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995). We modify the BLP method to allow the 
deal decisions to nest under the platform choices. We also adopt a technique to accelerate the 
computation speed, because the original BLP estimation performs extremely slowly for such a 
large sample size as ours. We use the squared polynomial extrapolation method (SQUAREM) to 
speed up the convergence. To address the concern that deal prices are endogenous to unobservable 
demand shocks, we use instruments to estimate the price coefficients.   
Our estimated distribution of price elasticity indicates that customers in the daily deal 
market are price-sensitive, with an average estimated elasticity of -2.85. Our estimate is 
comparable to the benchmark value for typical elastic goods. There is significant heterogeneity 
among consumers; those who are older, have higher incomes, or are from a larger household tend 
to be less price-elastic. Furthermore, our results reveal varying consumer preferences for different 
deal categories. Restaurant and beauty deals are the top two categories that help platforms grow 
their customer base. Deals on family activities, home and automobile services, life skill classes, 
sports, and travel activities are effective as well.  
Results from our supply model shed light on the relative bargaining power of platforms and 
merchants. As expected, we find that Groupon, the larger platform, has higher bargaining power 
than LivingSocial and that larger and chain merchants have higher bargaining power than smaller 
and independent merchants. The bargaining-power leverage for larger merchants, interestingly, is 
more substantial on LivingSocial, the smaller platform, which helps explain why those merchants 
are more likely to choose LivingSocial despite its smaller customer base. In a nutshell, when prices 
are negotiated, lack of bargaining power actually helps smaller platforms attract merchants while 
the larger platforms are, to a certain extent, disadvantaged by the bargaining power.  
                                                 
3 When modeling competition in a two-sided market, it is important to incorporate the full scale of both 
sides in order to account for the network effect. Using individual-level data from a representative sample is 
sufficient. 
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Results from our counterfactual analyses show that bargaining power plays an important role 
in the daily deal market. If platforms are able to boost their bargaining power, deals would be 
priced higher and yield lower sales. This would mean fewer customers reached for merchants and 
undermine their efforts to reach potential customers through deals. With a 5% increase in 
platforms’ bargaining power, merchants would end up with an 11.3% sales drop on Groupon and 
10.7% on LivingSocial. Note that this counterfactual is similar to the case of a vertical structure 
between a monopoly manufacturer and a monopoly retailer. That is, if the manufacturer sets the 
wholesale price and the retailer sets the retail price charged to consumers, the retail price includes 
two successive markups (double marginalization) and hence is higher than the one with the 
manufacturer and retailer being integrated (Spengler 1950). This intuition applies to our setting as 
well. Our results show that merchants’ bargaining power mitigates the price distortion for deals 
and increases the total sales quantity.    
Price-bargaining power also seems to play a role in platforms attracting merchants. Our 
counterfactual results show that, if LivingSocial is to increase its bargaining power, it would 
obtain a bigger margin and hence higher profits; however, a higher price leads to lower sales and 
LivingSocial would lose the pricing advantage that attracts merchants to work with it in the first 
place. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
describes the empirical setting, reports summary statistics, and provides some model-free evidence. 
Section 4 specifies the model, and Section 5 presents the estimation and identification strategy. 
Section 6 presents the parameter estimates and the counterfactual results. We conclude and 
discuss future research directions in Section 7. 
2 Literature Review  
This paper builds on two streams of research. First, it extends the rich literature on platform 
competition. Ever since the pioneer paper by Katz and Shapiro (1994) that highlighted the 
importance of network externalities, a series of theoretical papers (Rochet and Tirole 2006; Rochet 
and Tirole 2003; Armstrong 2006; Caillaud and Jullien 2003) have studied the platform business 
and examined the role of the pricing structure on platform competition. The key insight is that 
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the price charged to a side is inversely related to its price-elasticity adjusted by its strength of 
network externality on the other side. This makes it rational for some platforms to provide free 
services to one side and earn revenues from the others, as practiced by digital platforms such as 
eBay. However, existing theoretical papers largely assume that platforms set prices such that only 
platforms act strategically on pricing. But in reality, the pricing decision is often complicated and 
platforms may not have the market power to fully control price setting.  
Some recent papers relax this assumption. Hagiu and Lee (2011) study the pricing control 
between content distributors (platforms) and providers. By examining two extreme conditions—in 
which either the platforms or the content providers set the price, they find that how pricing 
control is distributed between platforms and content providers may determine the extent to which 
content providers are willing to be exclusive on one platform. One obvious restriction of this paper 
is that it studies the extreme cases and neglects the fact that prices are jointly determined 
through negotiations in many B2B settings. Shao (2015) studies more flexible price negotiations 
between platforms and content providers, and finds that an entrant platform’s greater bargaining 
power would make content providers more willing to work exclusively with the incumbent.  
Our paper is similar to Hagiu and Lee (2011) and Shao (2015) in the sense that we examine 
the extent to which control over pricing (that is, the allocation of price-bargaining power) affects 
prices and market outcomes. We differ by empirically examining the phenomenon using 
transactional data from a two-side market. In addition, we incorporate heterogeneity among 
consumers and merchants. Allowing merchant heterogeneity enables us to attribute the relative 
bargaining power to merchant characteristics, such that we can conduct counterfactual analyses 
more targeted to different types of merchants. Incorporating consumer heterogeneity allows us to 
estimate the distribution of price elasticity and to better understand the intensity of competition 
on the consumer side. 
The second related line of research is price bargaining between firms and suppliers. Despite 
the pervasiveness of bargaining in B2B environments, empirical work on this subject has only 
recently gained traction. The bilateral Nash bargaining model proposed by Horn and Wolinsky 
(1988) is advanced by Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) to study pricing decisions between content 
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distributors and conglomerates in the cable television industry. This Nash solution has since 
become the workhorse bargaining model for predicting the payoff split during B2B transactions in 
many applied settings. Grennan (2013) examines the role of bargaining power in price 
discrimination among hospitals in a medical device market. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) estimate 
a bargaining model of competition between hospitals and managed care organizations. Different 
from those papers emphasizing the effect of bargaining on social welfare, our research aims to 
better understand the managerial implications for platform managers in growing their business as 
well as for merchants in choosing platforms. 
Empirical marketing studies of price bargaining are sparse. The closest to our paper are Misra 
and Mohanty (2008) and Draganska et al. (2010), both of which examine bargaining in the 
retailing setting. The former estimated the relative bargaining power of manufacturers supplying 
to a single retailer and the latter extended the framework to include competition between retailers. 
In contrast to their works, the current research focuses on bargaining in a two-sided market, 
which distinguishes itself from retailing in two critical ways. First, the network effect between 
merchants and consumers is more prominent in a two-sided market than in retailing. Hence, it is 
critical to capture the externality value of a merchant to a platform and further allow that to 
enter the pricing decision. Second, the two settings also differ in terms of where the strategic 
actions may posit. In the retailing setting, retailers typically are the only strategic players when 
competing for consumers after they already contract with manufactures. However, platforms often 
facilitate the transactions between merchants and consumers, and hence both platforms and 
merchants may be strategic in setting the prices charged to consumers (Hagiu and Lee 2011). In 
other words, the bargaining outcomes may have a more direct impact on consumers in a two-sided 
market than in retailing.   
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first empirical marketing papers that examine 
price bargaining in a competition with network externalities. While two-sided markets have 
attracted marketing researchers in recent years (e.g., Dubé et al. 2010; Wilbur 2008), price 
bargaining is either assumed away or inapplicable; so little is known about this important business 
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practice. We bridge this gap and believe that our approach offers a good modeling framework to 
study platform competition where platforms do not have full control over pricing. 
3 Data and Model-free Evidence 
3.1 Empirical setting 
Daily deal sites emerged around 2008 as a marketplace that connected merchants to consumers by 
offering discounts. This business model experienced skyrocketing revenue growth for several years. 
In 2010, the Chicago-based market leader, Groupon, became the “fastest growing company in 
history.”4 Several factors may have accounted for such growth: consumers enjoyed a wide variety 
of deep discounts while merchants could use the deal platforms’ large customer bases to build 
awareness and generate extra revenue. Even though growth has slowed in recent years, the daily 
deal business remains a multibillion-dollar market. 
The name of the business—daily deals—refers to the fact that the sites in their early years 
typically featured one deal per day. This quickly evolved to multiple deals a day. A platform’s 
customers now have access to a searchable inventory of available deals and typically learn about 
new deals through email alerts or mobile app notifications or by visiting the platform’s website. 
The vast majority of the deals are from local businesses, although platforms do occasionally 
promote deals offered by national merchants to build awareness, acquire new customers, and 
generate additional revenue.  
The business model attracted a number of competitors, ranging from small local deal 
aggregators to large companies that offer deals as a sideline; Google Offers and Amazon Local are 
prominent examples. By and large, the market is dominated by two sites—in 2013, Groupon and 
LivingSocial earned roughly 59.1% and 16.6% of the US market’s revenue, respectively.5 
We compiled a comprehensive dataset from these two market leaders. It has four components: 
(1) deal data including sales, price, and other deal-level characteristics; (2) platform-level market 
                                                 
4 CNBC, December 2010, http://www.cnbc.com/id/40454493, accessed February 10, 2015. 
5 Statistica 2015. Retrieved from http://www.statista.com/statistics/322293/groupon-market-share-us/ on 
February 15, 2015. 
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shares; (3) the distribution of consumer characteristics; and (4) merchant characteristics. Figure 1 
illustrates the data components and the sources.  
<Figure 1> 
3.2 Deal sales 
We acquired deal sales from YipitData, a premium business database. Our data include all the 
deals offered by Groupon and LivingSocial in 2012. Each observation is a sales record for which we 
know the deal title, price, sales quantity, discount depth, face value, starting date, ending date, 
category, city, and merchant information. For example, Groupon featured a restaurant deal titled 
“$79 for an Italian Steak-House Prix Fixe Dinner for Two with Wine at Padre Figlio (Up to $189 
Value)” from June 27 to July 3 in New York. In this case, the price is $79, the original face value 
of the voucher $189, and the discount depth 63%. We also know the sales quantity for each deal. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the deal data. In 2012, Groupon promoted a total of 
roughly 129,000 deals, with an average price of $59.26 (SD=$61.15) and an average sales quantity 
of 244.2 (SD=886.0). Deals were evenly distributed over the months with slightly more offered in 
the third quarter. LivingSocial offered approximately 69,000 deals. The average price was $48.3 
(SD=$48.1) and the average sales quantity was 274.45 (SD=1,259.8).  
<Table 1> 
A deal belongs to one of twelve categories. Table 2 presents the size of each category and the 
summary statistics for price and sales by category. Across both platforms, the largest category is 
beauty followed by home and automobile services deals and restaurant deals. The relative sizes of 
the categories are largely comparable across platforms except that Groupon offered more goods 
deals than LivingSocial but the latter had more family deals and fitness deals. 
Deal prices vary substantially across categories. In general, the average deal price for a 
category was higher on Groupon than on LivingSocial except for live events deals, which had a 
higher average deal price on LivingSocial. Sales varied across categories and platforms. Groupon 
had higher average sales than LivingSocial for family, fitness, live events, and restaurants 
categories; LivingSocial had higher average sales for the others. We depict the number of deals 
and the average sales per category in Figure 2. 
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<Table 2> 
< Figure 2> 
3.3 Market definition and platform shares  
We acquired platform market usage data from two premium data sources that capture Web-
browsing behaviors for Internet users across the US. From Compete—the industry’s largest 
consumer behavior database that updates daily clickstream data based on a panel of 2.3 million 
US consumers—we obtained the number of unique visitors to www.Groupon.com and 
www.LivingSocial.com for each month of 2012.6 Compete data also provide the number of unique 
visitors who visited both sites, which was important for this study. From the comScore Media 
Metric database, which has a representative US consumer panel of roughly 47,000 members, we 
retrieve the geographical distribution of active users of Groupon, LivingSocial, and both. 
Combining these two data components, we computed the number of active users for each platform 
per market per month. We used these numbers to define the aggregate platform choices in the 
subsequent analysis.  
Groupon and LivingSocial divide the US market into so-called “divisions” which largely 
correspond to the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) defined by the Office of Management and 
Budget.7 A typical MSA is centered around a large city that has economic influence over a region. 
For example, the “Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI” MSA surrounds Chicago and includes 
areas in Indiana and Wisconsin. In the context of our data, Groupon served 156 markets and 
LivingSocial served 166, with 131 served by both.  
For each market, our analysis requires the “market size” for platform choices; that is, the 
total number of users who could possibly use one or both deal platforms. Potentially, any user 
with Internet access can use a deal site. Therefore, we use the number of Internet users to define 
the size of each market. The data are retrieved from the “October 2012 School Enrollment and 
                                                 
6 In our data-collection period, mobile usage was very limited for daily deal business, though it has since 
become an important channel. In 2014, more than 50% of the transactions on Groupon were completed on 
mobile devices (Groupon 10-K form 2014).  
7 The Office of Management and Budget divides the US into 388 MSAs.  
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Internet Use Survey,” a supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) by the US Census 
Bureau.  
Groupon’s and LivingSocial’s market shares are computed by combining data from the 
monthly platform-level usage data and the distribution of users across regions. Table 3 
summarizes these data. To construct the measures, we make the following calculation: (1) From 
comScore data we obtain the distribution of active users across census regions for each platform. 
For example, roughly 15.4% of Groupon users are from the mid-Atlantic region. (2) Within each 
region we assume that the number of users of a particular deal platform is proportional to the 
number of Internet users. For example, because Internet users in New York City make up 17.3% 
of the mid-Atlantic region total, the number of Groupon users in New York City is calculated as 
17.3% of the number of Groupon users in the mid-Atlantic region. (3) Combining the distributions 
from steps (1) and (2) with the number of active Groupon users in a given month—e.g., 18 
million—we calculate the number of active Groupon users in New York City in that month as 
17.3% x 15.4% x 18 million ≈ 480,000. Dividing these numbers by the market size gives us the 
market share for each platform choice in a market.  
<Table 3> 
During our data-collection period, approximately 6.5% of the Internet users exclusively used 
Groupon, 2.5% exclusively used LivingSocial, and 1.7% used both. The remaining 89.3% chose the 
“outside option”: either they purchased daily deals from other platforms or they did not 
participate in this market. 
It is noteworthy that our platform market shares are based on “active users”—visitors to one 
or both platforms during our data-collection period—who may be a subset of the subscribers who 
have signed up to receive email alerts. We consider active users to be a better measure of platform 
size than subscribers because the former better represents the pool of users who actively consider 
deal offers. A subscriber may use an inactive email account to sign up and not truly be a platform 
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user. Indeed, Groupon’s 2012 annual report stated that retaining active users was its strategic 
emphasis8.  
3.4 Other variables 
To estimate consumer heterogeneity in price sensitivity, we collected data on consumer 
characteristics. These data are also from the October 2012 CPS, which provides the empirical 
distributions of demographic and socioeconomic variables (such as income and household size) for 
Internet users in each market. 
We obtained the merchant profile data from OneSource, one of the most comprehensive 
providers of business and company data. For each merchant, we know the number of employees, 
the annual sales, and whether it belongs to a chain.  
3.5 Model-free evidence  
To understand pricing bargaining in this empirical setting, the immediate questions are: (1) is 
there evidence that platforms and merchants split the control over pricing, and (2) if yes, how do 
the price-bargaining dynamics differ by platforms? Below, we provide some model-free evidence to 
answer these two questions.  
Allocation of price-bargaining power within a platform: One way to measure a platform’s 
relative pricing power is through the Lerner index (Elzinga and Mills 2011), calculated as 
( ) /p mc p- , where p  is the deal price charged to consumers and mc , the marginal cost, 
corresponds to the amount that the platform pays the merchant. A higher Lerner index value 
indicates that the platform has greater discretion to set a price above the marginal cost.  
Computing the Lerner index requires knowing how much the platform pays the merchants, 
which is typically unavailable in public data sources. Fortunately, we were able to acquire a 
proprietary dataset from one of the two deal sites being studied in this paper. Due to the 
confidentiality agreement, we are not allowed to say which one. The uniqueness of this dataset is 
that, for all the deals (N=11,683) in a major category in 2012 and 2013, we observed the amount 
                                                 
8 Groupon 10-K form 2012 
14 
 
that the platform paid the merchant. We will refer to this dataset as the “payment” data, from 
which the Lerner index for each deal was computed and used to generate model-free evidence.  
First, we examine how the platform’s pricing discretion varies by merchant size. The platform 
internally coded the merchants as small, medium, or large. Figure 3a depicts the average Lerner 
index across deals for each of these three merchant sizes. Clearly, the focal platform has the 
highest average Lerner index for deals from small merchants and the lowest for deals from large 
merchants.  
Another way to gauge the platform’s pricing discretion is to slice the deals by their perceived 
quality. The argument is that when the platform and merchant know they are negotiating over a 
high-quality deal, the merchant’s threat to withdraw from the negotiation becomes more credible 
and hence, everything else equal, this merchant should have relatively higher bargaining power. In 
the payment dataset, the platform internally coded deals into four tiers; the higher the tier, the 
higher the perceived quality of a deal.9 Figure 3b depicts the average Lerner index by deal-quality 
tiers. Again, we observe that the focal platform has higher pricing discretion for deals in lower 
tiers and vice versa, showing that the platform was able to price deals with a higher margin over 
the cost when deals were perceived to have a lower quality. 
<Figure 3> 
Evidence on differences between platforms: By now we have seen that there is heterogeneity 
in a platform’s pricing discretion across different merchants. Naturally, the next question is: how 
does the pricing discretion vary between platforms?  
To answer this question, we have to use our full sample of deals, for which we do not observe 
how much the platforms paid the merchants; hence, we are unable to compute the Lerner’s index 
as in the previous section. Nevertheless, comparing deal prices can shed some light on platform 
differences. Table 4 shows that Groupon charged a higher average price than LivingSocial. Given 
that deals may also vary by their face value, we split the sample into those with a low, medium, 
                                                 
9 The platform coded the “tier” variable based on its private information about the merchants. Roughly, the 
information includes the merchant’s type and size, previous sales performance, and number of social media 
followers. 
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and high face value. Within each level of face value, the average deal price is higher on Groupon 
than on LivingSocial by roughly 9%, 2%, and 9%, respectively. This seems to suggest that 
Groupon was able to set a higher price than LivingSocial given a fixed face value. In addition, we 
see a similar pattern when we split the deals by categories: the average deal price is always higher 
on Groupon than on LivingSocial within each category except for live events (see Table 2).  
<Table 4> 
Next, what kind of merchants tends to use each platform? Here, we examine two merchant-
specific characteristics—size as measured in the number of employees and whether the merchant 
belongs to a chain business. Table 5 summarizes the average merchant size and the proportion of 
chain businesses for Groupon and LivingSocial. When deals have a low to medium (<$220) face 
value, larger merchants and those belonging to a chain are more likely to use Groupon than 
LivingSocial. Interestingly, the pattern switches for merchants offering a high-face-value deal: in 
this case, those working with LivingSocial tend to be larger size (two-sample t test, p < 0.001) 
and are more likely to belong to a chain (p = 0.052). We hypothesize that it is perhaps because 
larger and chain merchants offering high-face-value deals may have a disproportionate pricing 
advantage on LivingSocial. Thus, they can better influence the pricing decision on LivingSocial 
and achieve more sales despite LivingSocial’s smaller customer base to begin with. To test this 
hypothesis, we then develop a structural model to examine the pricing decisions between platforms 
and merchants.  
<Table 5> 
4 Model 
In this section, we model consumer choices and the price negotiation between platforms and 
merchants. We first describe our demand model and then the supply-side specification.  
4.1 Demand 
We study consumers’ decisions using a random-coefficient aggregate discrete-choice model. In our 
setting, a consumer follows a two-stage decision process: she needs to choose which platform(s) to 
use and then, given the choice of platform(s), she considers whether to buy a particular deal. This 
nested structure is similar to how consumers choose intermediaries in vertical markets (e.g., Ho 
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2006). Again, we present our model specification backwards: we present the model for deal 
demand followed by that for platform choices.  
4.1.1 Deal demand 
Consumer i , active on platform k , derives utility from deal j  on that platform in market m  at 
time t . Her utility is specified as  
  pijkmt i i jkmt jkmt jkmt ijkmtu p xi i b x k= + + + +  ,  (1) 
where ii  and 
p
ii  are individual-specific deal preference and price parameter; jkmtx  is 
observable deal characteristics; jkmtx  is deal-specific shocks unobservable to the 
econometrician but observable to the consumer and the platform, and ijkmtk  is the 
idiosyncratic utility shocks. In the deal-demand specification, index j  uniquely identifies a 
deal that is offered on platform k  in market m  at time t . Hence, subscripts for platforms, 
markets, and time are omitted to avoid redundancy in this section.   
Our demand model follows the BLP specification pioneered by Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 
(1995). An important deviation in our model, however, is that we assume that a consumer makes 
the decision to purchase deal j  independently of her decision to purchase another deal 'j j¹ . In 
other words, the deals are treated as neither substitutes nor complements. We make this 
independence assumption for two reasons. First, in this empirical setting, deals vary substantially, 
even when they are in the same category in the same market around the same time. For example, 
tickets to different theaters in a city are for different shows and dinner at an Italian restaurant is 
very different from lunch at a Chinese buffet. Therefore, it is challenging to argue that consumers 
treat deals as substitutes and have to choose one over the others. Rather, we think deals are 
better treated as independent options. Second, this independence assumption enables us to 
construct the total deal utility that a consumer derives from the option of being able to purchase 
from a specific platform. By this specification, we allow more deals on a platform to potentially 
yield a higher option value for the platform. The same assumption was made by Lee (2013) to 
model the total option utility that a video gamer derives from a game console. 
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The taste parameters for overall deal preference and prices are allowed to be individual-
specific and are specified as a function of observable and unobservable individual characteristics: 
 i i i
p p p p p
i i i
D
D
i i p pn
i i p p n
= + +
= + +
 , (2) 
where i  and pi are the grand means for the overall preference and price sensitivity, 
respectively; iD  are the observable individual-level socio-demographic variables and are 
assumed to follow an empirical distribution ~ ( )i i iD F D ; p ’s are the deviation from the 
mean preference that is attributable to iD ;  in ’s are individual-specific idiosyncratic 
shocks and are assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution ( , )N 0 I ; and p ’s 
capture the degree of preference heterogeneity related to in . 
Plugging the individual-specific parameters into the deal utility, we get 
 
( ) ( )
p
ij j j j
p p p
i i i i j ij
u p x
D D p
i i b x
p p) p p ) k
= + + +
+ + + + +
. (3) 
We rewrite the utility as the sum of three components: the grand mean utility across all 
individuals, pj j j jp xd i i b x= + + + ; the individual deviation from the grand mean, 
( ) ( )p p pij i i i i jD D pm p p) p p )= + + + ; and an idiosyncratic shock ijk . Following the BLP 
notation, we refer to 1 ( , , )
p1 i i b=  as the linear parameters and 2 ( , , , )
p p1 p p p p=  as the 
nonlinear parameters. 
A consumer may choose not to buy deal j , yielding the outside option, which can be 
understood as the best alternative to purchasing the deal. A consumer buys the deal if its utility 
exceeds that of the outside option. Because the scale of utility is arbitrary, we set it by defining 
the utility of the outside option to be a constant plus 0ik .  
We assume that ijk  are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a type I 
extreme value distribution with mean 0 and variance scaled at / 6p  (Train 2009). With this 
distributional assumption, the percentage of consumers purchasing deal j  is given as 
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exp( )
( , )
1 exp( )
j ij
j i i
j ij
s dF D
d m
)
d m
+
=
+ +ò ,  (4) 
which corresponds to our observed data and hence forms the basis for estimation. 
It is noteworthy that deal prices are likely to be determined endogenously, as deals with 
positive or negative demand shocks may sell at a higher or lower price. In our specification, this 
means that jp  and jx  are not independent; we therefore need instruments for identification, 
which we discuss in Section 5.1.1.  
4.1.2 Platform choices 
Next, we model a consumer’s decision to choose platform(s). Three main considerations underline 
our model formulation.  
(1) At the moment of choosing platforms, a consumer may not observe the idiosyncratic 
demand shocks for deals. Therefore, she forms expectations of the utility that may be derived from 
each platform. In other words, the appeal of a platform to a consumer reflects the value that she 
expects to derive from being exposed to the deals offered on the platform. We use ikmtEU  to 
denote the total expected deal utility that individual i  expects to receive from platform k  in 
market m  at time t .  
(2) Consumers may have varying preferences for deals in different categories. For example, 
fitness deals may be more popular than deals for life skill classes. Therefore, we decompose the 
total platform utility into platform-category-specific utility and, thus,  ickmtEU  denotes the total 
deal utility that consumer i  expects to derive from deals in category c  on platform k  in market 
m  at time t . 
(3) Consumers can single-home or multi-home: in our empirical setting, some only used 
Groupon, some only used LivingSocial, and some used both. Our model incorporates this 
flexibility and does not treat platforms as mutually exclusive options. Instead, we regroup 
platform choices so that each consumer may fall into one and only one of these four groups: 
Groupon only, LivingSocial only, multi-homing, and neither (the outside option). This coding 
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scheme allows us to cast the platform decision under the discrete-choice model framework and 
take advantage of the closed-form formulation that such models entail.   
The ex-ante expected utility of a deal is given by (max( ))ijkmt ijkmtEU E uk= , where ijkmtu  is 
the utility that consumer i  derives from deal j . As i  does not observe the idiosyncratic shock 
ijkmtk  when she makes her platform decision, (max( ))ijkmtE uk  captures her expectation of the 
utility for deal j  integrated over the distribution of ijkmtk . Assuming i.i.d. type I extreme-value 
distribution for ijkmtk , we reduce this formula to  
 log(exp( ))ijkmt jkmt ijkmt jkmt ijkmtEU d m d m= + = + .    (5) 
The total expected category-level utility, ickmtEU , is defined as  
 log exp( )
ckmt
ickmt ijkmt
j J
EU EU
Î
= å ,  (6) 
which is summed over all individual deals in category c  on platform k  in market m  at time t , 
denoted as ckmtJ . Ho (2006) used a similar formulation to model the total expected utility over a 
set of hospitals in the context of patients choosing medical providers. 
Here, ickmtEU  can be understood as capturing the expected option value for a deal category; 
that is, a consumer has the option to purchase every deal in this category offered by the platform. 
Everything else equal, the more deals offered and the higher their quality, the higher the option 
value.  
As mentioned earlier, we assume that a consumer can choose either, both, or neither of the 
platforms. Let { , , ,0}r R g l glÎ º  denote the set of platform choices. A consumer’s choice is 
coded as r g=  if she uses only Groupon, r l=  if only LivingSocial, r gl=  if both, and 0r =  
if neither. The utility that consumer i  derives from platform choice r  in market m  at time t  is 
 
k
pf pf
irmt c ickmt t rm rmt irmt
k r c C
u EUg w h h k
Î Î
æ ö÷ç ÷ç= + + +D +÷ç ÷ç ÷è ø
å å  ,  (7) 
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where cg  is the taste parameter for deal category c ; 
k
c ickmt
c C
EUg
Î
å  is the consumer i ’s total 
expected utility for category c  on platform k  that belongs to set r ;  tw  is the fixed effect for 
month t  that captures the time-specific shocks at the industry level (for example, mass media 
may broadcast stories on daily deals that boost (or diminish) consumers’ overall interest in this 
market); rmh  represents the time-invariant fixed effects that capture the overall preference 
towards option r  across consumers in market m ; rmth  is the time-specific deviation from rmh ; 
and pfirmtk  represents the idiosyncratic demand shocks specific to individual, platform, market, and 
time. A consumer chooses whichever set r  maximizes her utility.  
We define the outside option as an individual choosing neither platform ( 0r = ) and scale 
the utility by restricting the outside option utility as 0 00
pf pf
i mt i mtu k= + .  
The fixed effects for platform and market, rmh , represent the market-level mean time-
invariant set-specific value (independent of the deals being offered) net of the cost associated with 
using the platform(s) in set r . This value could be a manifest of things, including but not 
restricted to each platform’s reputation and the quality of its customer services, such as shipping 
speed and return policy. There could also be search cost or other nonmonetary costs of using deal 
platforms; for example, the disutility of having to deal with the multiple daily email alerts that 
deal platforms typically send out. Without the fixed effects, one would expect consumers to 
always multi-home, as more deal options would always yield higher expected total utility. In 
reality, however, many consumers single-home, suggesting that there is a cost for consumers to 
consider multiple platforms.  
Again, under the assumption that pfirmtk  is i.i.d. from a type I extreme value distribution, the 
market share for set r  becomes  
 ( , )pf pfrmt irmt i is s dF D n= ò  , 
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where 
c
exp
exp
k
k
c ickmt t rm rmt
k r c Cpf
irmt
c i kmt t qm qmt
q R k q c C
EU
s
EU
g w h h
g w h h
Î Î
Î Î Î
æ öæ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷ç ç + + + ÷÷ç ç ÷÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç è øè ø= æ öæ ö ÷ç ÷ç ÷÷ç ç + + + ÷÷ç ç ÷÷ç ç ÷ ÷ç è øè ø
å å
å å å


.     (8) 
4.2 Supply model 
On the supply side, platforms and merchants bargain to set the price charged to consumers. 
Formally, the outcomes of these negotiations are the equilibrium of bilateral Nash bargaining 
problems in the sense that neither the platforms nor the merchants want to deviate from the 
determined prices. The Nash model, developed by Horn and Wolinsky (1988), has become the 
workhorse for empirical work on bilateral negotiations. In our application, the prices maximize the 
Nash product of the payoffs to the platform and to the merchant with an agreement relative to 
the payoffs without an agreement. That is, the prices solve 
 
( ) (j)
max ( )( ) ( ) )jmt kmt
jkmt
b k b
p jkmt jkmt jkmt jmt kmt mt jkmtq p h c p dpé ù é ù- -ê ú ê úë û ë û     kmtj J" Î ,  (9) 
where jkmth  is the payment that merchant j  receives from platform k , jmtc  is the merchant’s 
marginal cost of fulfilling the deal, kmtp is platform k ’s profits in market m  during time t if an 
agreement is reached between j  and k , and jkmtd  is the platform’s disagreement payoff if an 
agreement is not reached. The platform’s profits depend on the deal demand and margin10 across 
all the deals it offers in the market: ( )( )
kmt
kmt jkmt jkmt jkmt jkmt
j J
q p p hp
Î
= -å .  
Parameter ( ) 0jmtb k ³  is the price-bargaining power of merchant j  when facing platform k , 
and ( ) 0kmtb j ³  is k ’s bargaining power when facing j . Bargaining parameters are not separately 
identifiable, hence we normalize them by ( ) ( ) 1kmt jmtb j b k+ = . If ( ) 1kmtb j = , the platform sets 
the price and the merchant uses a take-it-or-leave-it strategy. Similarly, if ( ) 1jmtb k = , the 
                                                 
10 Notice that we assume the platform have zero marginal cost in selling an additional deal; this is 
reasonable because deal sites operate online. 
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merchant sets the price and the platform uses the take-it-or-leave-it strategy. Hence, this Nash 
bargaining model nests the Bertrand pricing model as a special case. 
As in the bargaining literature, different threat points lead to different disagreement payoffs. 
Following Horn and Wolinsky (1988), we assume that other contracts—possibly including those 
between the platform and other merchants—would not be renegotiated if platform k  and 
merchant j  do not reach an agreement. The platform’s disagreement payoff thus becomes 
(p ; \ { })jkmt kmt mt kmtd J jp= ; that is, the profits for platform k  in market m  during time t given 
the prices of all remaining deals. 
To better understand the equilibrium properties of our model, we solve the first-order 
condition (FOC) of this Nash bargaining problem and obtain the following pricing equation: 
 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) /
( )
( ) ( )
jkmtkmt
jkmt jkmt
kmt jmt jkmt jkmt
jmt kmt jkmt
jkmt jkmt
kmt jmt jkmt
qb j
p h
b j b k q p
b k d
p h
b j b k q
p
= + ×
+ -¶ ¶
é ù-ê ú+ × - -ê ú+ ê úë û
 . (10) 
The first term in Equation (10) is the payment made by the platform to the merchant. The 
second component is the platform’s markup resulting from the Bertrand-Nash best-response price, 
weighted by the platform’s relative bargaining power. It is obvious that, when ( ) 1kmtb j = , the 
equilibrium price becomes the platform’s Bertrand-Nash best-response price. The third component 
captures the merchant’s “externality value” to the platform through kmt jkmt
jkmt
d
q
p -
. A merchant 
contributes to a platform’s profits not only through generating revenues from the focal deal but 
also through growing the platform’s customer base. The greater the externality value for a deal, 
the lower price the platform is willing to accept.  
To gain further understanding of the pricing equation, we make algebraic manipulation of 
Equation (10) and obtain the following relation: 
 
( )
/ ( )
jkmt jmt kmt jkmt
jkmt jkmt
jkmt jkmt kmt jkmt
q b k d
p h
q p b j q
p -
- = - ×
-¶ ¶
,  (11) 
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which indicates that the platform’s markup is upper bounded by the Bertrand-Nash best-response 
markup when the platform sets the price. The markup is lower when (1) the merchant’s relative 
bargaining power is higher, or (2) the merchant’s externality value to the platform is higher.  
Note that jkmth  is unobservable to researchers. We therefore set a structure and specify it to 
be proportional to the face value of a voucher:  
 ( )Facejkmt k c jkmth Valuek k= +  , (12) 
where kk  and ck  are parameters to be estimated. By this specification, we assume that the 
payment made to merchant j  is linearly related to the voucher’s face value, which may be a 
fairly strong assumption. In Section 5.2, we provide robustness checks on this linear functional 
form. We do allow the ratio of jkmth  to jkmtFaceValue  to vary by category and platform, though 
it is assumed to be homogeneous within the same category-platform combination.  
After regrouping the terms, we rewrite Equation (11) and further parameterize the price-
bargaining ratio as a function of observable platform and merchant characteristics, jkmtj , and 
unobservables, jkmtV : 
 
( )
( ; )
( )
jmt
jkmt jkmt jkmt jkmt
kmt
b k
g p
b j
k j V= = +  , (13) 
where the left-hand side of the equation, ( ; ) ( ) /
'
jkmt kmt jkmt
jkmt jkmt jkmt
jkmt jkmt
q d
g p p h
q q
p
k
é ù -ê ú= - -ê ú-ê úë û
, can 
be constructed based on the estimated structural parameters. We describe the choice of observable 
characteristics, jkmtj , and other estimation details in Section 5.2. 
5 Estimation, Identification, and Computation 
In this section, we present our estimation strategy, discuss parameter identification, and provide 
details on the computation.  
5.1 Estimation of the demand-side parameters 
We adopt the BLP method to address price endogeneity and incorporate consumer heterogeneity 
in deal preference and price sensitivity. The parameters are estimated by minimizing an objective 
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function based on a set of moment conditions as defined in the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) (Hansen 1982).  
5.1.1 Deal-demand estimation  
We begin by describing the variables used in the deal-demand specification. The vector of 
observable deal characteristics, jx , includes price, the voucher’s face value, the month in which 
the deal was offered (to capture any seasonal effect), deal category, and the size of the market 
(dummy variables indicating top-20 markets, markets ranked 21 to 40 markets, and otherwise). 
We use the logarithm of prices in the estimation to address the skewness in this variable. Deals 
may be substantially different even within the same category. For example, a ticket package to a 
premium children’s play, such as “How to Train Your Dragon” at the IZOD Center, is priced 
around $80-90, while a fine play like “Sesame Street Live: Can't Stop Singing” typically have a 
face value around $30. We include the voucher’s face value to at least partially control for deal 
heterogeneity.  
For individual characteristics, iD , we include annual income, household size, and age. As in 
Equation (2), we allow the overall deal preference and price sensitivity to depend on those 
individual characteristics. We simulate the values for each variable based on its empirical 
distribution. 
When estimating the price parameter, pi , we need to account for a nonzero correlation 
between jp  and jx . Because a deal with higher demand shocks, jx , may cost more but still end 
up with higher sales, failing to account for endogeneity would bias the price estimate towards zero. 
A valid price instrument should be correlated with jp  but exogenous to jx . We choose as price 
instruments (a) the average price of all the deals from the same category in other markets during 
the same month on the focal platform and (b) the same average for the other platform. These 
instruments are similar to those used in (Hausman 1996; Nevo 2001). Because the instruments are 
averaged across deals of the same category around the same time, they should be correlated with 
jp , due to common cost shifters at the category level. Because the averages are based on deals 
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from other markets, it is reasonable to assume that the price instruments are uncorrelated with 
the demand shocks in the focal market. We set the restriction criteria as ( ) 0jE Z x× = . Note that 
these instruments would be invalid if they were only weakly correlated with the focal deal’s price 
(causing weak-instrument problems) or if the unobservable demand shocks were correlated across 
markets (violating the exogeneity requirement). We provide diagnostic statistics for the 
instruments in the results section.  
5.1.2 Platform demand estimation 
Equation (7) specifies the total utility that a consumer expects to derive from each platform set. 
We further use 1 2( ( ); , )
k
ikmt c ickmt
c C
EUd 1 g 1 g
Î
G = å  to denote the part of the utility directly related 
to deals being offered. Here, g  is the vector of category-specific taste preferences, d  is the vector 
of deal mean utilities, and 21  is the vector of nonlinear utility parameters in the deal demand.  
After plugging in 1 2( ( ); , )ikmt d 1 g 1G  and regrouping terms, we write the aggregated market 
shares for platform sets as 
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where , , , , , , , , , , ,
{ , , }
exp( ) exp( ) exp( )pf pf pfi g mt g mt i l mt l mt i g mt i l mt gl mt
r g l gl
d d d
=
= G + + G + + G + G +å . 
The linear component of the aggregated platform shares becomes 
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 . (14) 
Here, we are also concerned with potential endogeneity problems. A popular platform may 
offer more and better deals, introducing a nonzero correlation between rmh  and rmthD . To address 
this concern, we use the within-group fixed-effect estimator and use the first-differences 
transformation to eliminate the fixed effects. After the transformation, Equation (14) becomes 
 , , 1 1 , , 1
, ,
( ) ( )pf pfrm t rm t t t rm t rm t
pf
rm t t rm tD D D
d d w w h h
d w h
- - -- = - + D -D
= + D
 ,  (15) 
where , , , 1
pf pf pf
rm t rm t rm tDd d d -= -  , 1t t tDw w w -= -  and , , , 1rm t rm t rm tD h h h -D = D -D . We then form 
the identification restriction as ( ) 0t rmtE D Dw h× D = .   
5.1.3 BLP computation 
Generally perceived as a nested fixed-point (NFXP) algorithm, the BLP method incorporates a 
contraction mapping step in which one inverts the demand system to recover a vector of mean 
utility, d , that equates the predicted market shares with the observed market shares. In the BLP 
scheme, this contraction mapping step is an inner loop nested within an outer loop to search for 
the nonlinear utility using GMM. 
Berry et al. (1995) prove that the fixed-point iteration used in the BLP scheme is guaranteed 
to converge. While this global convergence property is appealing, the BLP contraction mapping 
can be time-consuming, especially when the sample size exceeds 5,000. In order to speed up 
convergence, a common technique is to (a) relax the inner-loop tolerance value ( ink ) in regions 
where the minimization of the GMM objective function is far from the true solution and (b) 
tighten the tolerance criterion as the minimization gets closer to the truth. However, this 
procedure may lead to incorrect estimates, as Dube, Fox, and Su (2012) show that the inner-loop 
tolerance must be set at 1410- with the outer-loop tolerance at 610- . 
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To accelerate the convergence without being penalized for estimation bias, we adopt the 
squared polynomial extrapolation method (SQUAREM), a state-of-the-art algorithm that can 
operate directly on the fixed-point formulation of the BLP contraction mapping. Originally 
developed to accelerate the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm, SQUAREM has been 
shown to be not only faster but also more robust (in terms of the success rate of convergence) 
than the original contraction mapping procedure used in BLP (Reynaerts et al. 2012; Varadhan 
and Roland 2008). The advantage of SQUAREM is even more substantial when the sample size is 
large (as in our case) and when the initial values of the parameters are far from the truth.11  
It is noteworthy that estimating the deal-demand parameters separately from the platform-
demand parameters may also yield inaccurate estimates due to selection bias. Consumers may self-
select onto different platforms depending on their preferences and the platforms may tailor their 
offerings accordingly, introducing another source of endogeneity. We therefore jointly estimate 
Equations (1) and (7) by iteratively solving for the deal-demand and the platform-demand 
parameters during the optimization search.  
The details of the estimation routine are as follows: 
1. For each market, simulate NS=1,000 individuals  
a. with observable characteristics from empirical marginal distributions, ( )iF D   
b. with unobservable idiosyncratic shocks, in , simulated from a multivariate standard 
normal distribution  
2. Assign initial values for i , pi , and b  and calculate the initial value for jd : 
(0) p
j j jp xd i i b= + +   
3. Given 21  and jd , predict the share for each deal 
a. given 2 ( , , , )
p p1 p p p p= : ( ) ( )p p pij i i i i jD D pm p p) p p )= + + +   
                                                 
11 For example, in our application, one search for the vector jd  took 26 iterations and 3.5 minutes using the 
SQUAREM accelerator and over 5,000 iterations and 3 hours using the BLP contraction mapping with the 
inner-loop tolerance set at 10-14. 
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4. Conduct BLP contraction mapping with SQUAREM accelerator to search for jd  such that 
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+ - < , where ink  is the inner-loop tolerance set 
as 1410-  
5. Given pj j j jp xd i i b x= + + + , analytically solve for the deal-demand linear 
parameters, 1 ( , , )
p1 i i b=   
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7. Given irmtG , compute the predicted platform shares 
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8. As in step 4, perform BLP contraction mapping with the SQUAREM accelerator to search 
for pfrmtd
pf
qmtd  so that 
pf pf
rmt rmtsp =
  as long as ( ) ( )( 1) ( )h hpf pfrmt rmt ind d k
+
- <  
9. Form the GMM moment conditions based on ( ) 0jE Z x× =  and ( ) 0t rmtE D Dw h× D = , 
and repeat from step 3 for each iteration of the optimization. 
5.2 Supply model estimation 
In Equation (12), we restrict the payment made to a merchant being proportional to the voucher’s 
face value. To assess the validity of this assumption, we turn to our payment data where jkmth  are 
observed and find a correlation of 0.849 (N=11,674, p<0.01) between jkmth  and jkmtFaceValue , 
suggesting that the linear functional form is reasonable. Adding a quadratic term only minimally 
improves the predictive power of jkmtFaceValue for jkmth ; the 
2R  of a simple linear regression 
increases from 0.72 to 0.75. We therefore retain the linear functional form in subsequent 
estimations.  
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The function ( ; )jkmtg p k  requires the implied deal demand, jkmtq , the platform’s profits with 
the agreement, kmtp , its disagreement payoffs, jkmtd , and the price elasticity term, 'jkmtq , all of 
which are constructed based on our demand parameter estimates. Parameter jkmtj  captures how 
the relative bargaining power depends on the platform and merchant observables. For platforms, 
we use the Groupon dummy to measure the difference in bargaining power between Groupon and 
LivingSocial. The fixed-effect approach, however, does not apply to merchants, because there are 
too many of them. Therefore, we parametrize the merchant difference based on two important 
merchant characteristics: the number of employees and whether the merchant belongs to a chain 
(1=chain; 0=independent). For both variables, we include both the main effect and an interaction 
with the Groupon dummy, thus allowing the bargaining-power difference between merchants to 
vary by platform. We also control for the merchant’s annual sales and the voucher face value in 
the analysis. We take the logarithm transformations for the continuous variables, such that our 
estimates are less influenced by extreme values. 
The rest of the estimation is straightforward. Again, we use GMM to solve for the parameters 
and we set the moment condition as 'E 0s jkZ Vé ù =ê úë û . The supply-side instruments, 
sZ , are set to 
be jkmtj , under the assumption that the observables are exogenous to jkV  after controlling for all 
the included variables.  
5.3 Identification 
The linear parameters, 11 , are straightforwardly identified via the cross-sectional variation across 
deals. The nonlinear parameters, 21 , are identified through the variation in deals that have similar 
observables but end up with different sales quantities in markets with varying consumer 
characteristics. Imagine that two deals, identical except for price, are offered in markets A and B. 
If market A has higher average incomes, a larger average household size, and an older population 
and the deal has a higher price in that market but the sales are no less than the sales in market B, 
this would identify positive price coefficients for income, household size, and age.   
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The taste parameters for deal categories, g , are identified through the within-market 
variation in deal offers and platform market shares. In a given market, if the change in a 
platform’s market share is positively and substantially associated with a change in its offerings in 
a particular category (e.g., restaurant deals) the taste parameter for that category would be 
estimated to be large.  
The supply parameters associated with the platform fixed effect and the merchant 
observables are identified through the cross-sectional variation across platforms and merchants. 
Imagine that two merchants with the same characteristics offer deals with the same face value, 
one on Groupon and one on LivingSocial. If the one on Groupon has a higher price, this would 
suggest that Groupon has more bargaining power and its fixed effect would be estimated to be 
positive. In another scenario, two merchants of the same size offer deals with the same face value 
on the same platform, but one merchant belongs to a chain and the other is an independent 
business. If the deal from the chain merchant has a lower price, this would suggest that the chain 
merchant has more bargaining power and the parameter estimate for the chain indicator would be 
estimated to be negative. The arguments for identifying the other parameters are similar.   
6 Results 
6.1 Demand parameter estimates 
We examine several specifications of the deal demand and present the linear parameter estimates 
in Table 6. The first specification is a homogeneous logit model without accounting for price 
endogeneity or heterogeneity across individuals. This is simply the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimate with the dependent variable being the logarithm of the deal share minus the logarithm of 
the outside share. Results from specification (1) are used as benchmark values.  
In the second specification, we use the Hausman-type price instruments discussed in Section 
5.1.1, though we still do not account for consumer heterogeneity. With IV, the price coefficient 
was estimated to be much stronger: -2.875 with IV versus -0.834 without it. The direction of the 
change is as expected when prices and the unobservable demand shocks are positively correlated: 
when popular deals are priced high and unpopular ones are priced low, the OLS estimate of the 
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price coefficient would be attenuated towards zero, as in our case. To assess the validity of the 
instruments, we run the first-stage regression and find the F statistic to be 1460.9 (p<0.01). We 
also run the Stock and Yogo (Stata 2013) test for weak instruments: our F statistic is higher than 
the test-critical value of 19.9, rejecting the null hypothesis of weak instruments.  
<Table 6> 
Specification (3) is the random-coefficient aggregate logit model that uses the price 
instruments and also incorporates individual preferences as a function of income, household size, 
and age. As expected, the mean price coefficient is estimated to be negative and significant ( pi = 
-3.952, p<0.01). The corresponding random coefficient estimates are reported in Table 7. We find 
significant variation in price elasticity across individuals: people who are older, have a higher 
income, or come from a larger household are significantly less price-sensitive for daily deals. After 
controlling for those consumer characteristics, there is still significant heterogeneity in price 
elasticity ( pp =0.354, p<0.01). The overall deal preference varies by individual income, household 
size, and age as well. Our estimates indicate that consumers who have a higher income or come 
from a larger household tend to like deals less and that older consumers like deals more.  
<Table 7> 
Using the estimated demand parameters, we compute the mean price elasticity. Across all the 
deals, the average price elasticity is -2.85 with the interquartile range of (-3.10, -2.64). Such a high 
elasticity indicates that customers are highly sensitive to deal price fluctuations. To put these 
numbers in perspective, the average price elasticity for consumer packaged goods is around -2.50 
(Tellis 1988). Soft drinks are typically considered elastic goods: Coca-Cola has an elasticity of -3.8 
while Mountain Dew’s is -4.4 (Ayers and Collinge 2003). Alcoholic beverages typically have 
elasticity between -1.0 and -1.5.  
Next, we discuss consumers’ preferences for different deal categories as they choose platforms. 
The higher the estimate for cg , the more a category is able to attract consumers to a platform. 
Our results reveal substantial heterogeneity across categories in their capacity to grow a 
platform’s customer base. We find that restaurant deals have the highest appeal (0.011, p<0.01). 
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beauty deals (such as haircuts, hair removals, and facials) come in second (0.005, p<0.01). Five 
other categories—family activities, home and automobile services, life skill classes, sports, and 
travel activities—are also effective in growing a platform’s customer base. The remaining 
categories—fitness, goods, live events, outdoor activities, and personal care services—exert 
minimal influence on a consumer’s choice of a platform. In general, these categories tend to have 
fewer deals, lower sales, or both, which partially explains why they are ineffective in attracting 
users to a platform.  
<Table 8> 
6.2 Supply parameter estimates 
In Table 9, we present the estimates for the supply parameters12 specified in Equation (13). We 
are interested in how the relative bargaining power depends on the platform’s and the merchants’ 
characteristics. Note that the ratio of bargaining power, ( ) / ( )jmt kmtb k b j , is specified as the 
merchant’s bargaining power relative to the platform’s; hence, higher parameter estimates 
correspond to higher relative bargaining power for merchants.  
First, we find that merchants have lower bargaining power on Groupon than on LivingSocial 
(-1.444, p<0.01), as we would expect due to Groupon’s leading position in the market. We also 
find that price-bargaining power varies by merchant size and type. Larger merchants—in terms of 
the number of employees—tend to have higher price-bargaining power than smaller ones (0.016, 
p<0.05). Furthermore, the interaction between the Groupon dummy and merchant size is 
estimated to be negative (-0.020, p<0.01), suggesting that the gap in merchant’s relative 
bargaining power between Groupon and LivingSocial is wider for larger merchants than for 
smaller ones. A similar pattern is observed for merchants offering vouchers with a higher face 
value: they have higher bargaining power (0.638, p<0.01) than those with a low face value. Even 
though both types have higher bargaining power on LivingSocial than on Groupon, the gap in 
their bargaining power between platforms is bigger for merchants with a higher face value. 
                                                 
12 The current estimates are based on a subset of data (N=17,470 deals). The smaller sample size is due to 
the time-consuming process of cleaning merchant names to match those in the OneSource database. As we 
have continued to increase the sample size, the reported patterns have so far been duplicated.  
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The main effect for the merchant’s chain business status and annual sales are also estimated 
to be positive: chain merchants and those with higher annual revenues tend to have higher price-
bargaining power than otherwise.  
Furthermore, our results show that LivingSocial pays the merchant between 29.3% and 34.9% 
of the face value; the percentages vary by categories, with the lowest percentage for the beauty 
deals and the highest for travel activities. The payment made by Groupon is lower than the 
payment by LivingSocial by 13.9%.  
<Table 9> 
Using the supply parameter estimates, we compute the platform’s relative bargaining power, 
( )
( ) ( )
kmt
kmt jmt
b j
b j b k+
, by normalizing the sum of the bargaining power for a platform-merchant pair to 
1. The histogram of the bargaining power is depicted in Figure 4. The average relative bargaining 
power for Groupon was 0.61 (SD=0.18); the value higher than 0.5 indicates that Groupon on 
average had higher bargaining power than merchants. The average bargaining power for 
LivingSocial was 0.36 (SD=0.10), showing that merchants had higher bargaining power than 
LivingSocial. The high standard deviations tell that substantial heterogeneity exists in bargaining 
power within a platform across merchants of different characteristics.    
<Figure 4> 
6.3 Counterfactuals 
In this section, we conduct counterfactual analysis to better understand the role of price-
bargaining power in the daily deal market. The first question we ask is: what would happen to a 
deal’s price and demand if the platform is able to increase its price-bargaining power? If a 
platform had a higher ability to influence price to its advantage, we would expect the 
counterfactual price to rise towards the platform’s Bertrand best-response price, and hence the 
platform would yield higher profits. However, due to the higher price, merchants would receive 
lower sales and reach fewer customers. Results of this counterfactual analysis can help us 
understand the magnitude of this effect and shed light on the extent to which price bargaining 
matters in this market.  
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To conduct this analysis, we inflate a platform’s price bargaining power by 5%, 10%, 20%, 
and 50%, respectively, and then compute the counterfactual price and demand given the new 
bargaining power. Results are presented in Table 10. When Groupon’s price-bargaining power 
increases by 5%, our calculation indicates that its average deal price would increase by 4.4%, 
leading to an average of an 11.3% drop in sales. But the increase in deal margin offsets the drop in 
demand, resulting in an increase of Groupon’s profits by 2.3%. The gain in Groupon’s profits is 
3.1%, 3.4%, and 13.0% with 10%, 20%, and 50% increases in its price-bargaining power, 
respectively. 
The profit changes are more substantial on LivingSocial because it has lower bargaining 
power to begin with. We find that LivingSocial’s profits would increase by roughly 15.5% 
corresponding to a 5% increase in its bargaining power. If it increases the bargaining power by 
10%, 20%, and 50%, LivingSocial would be able to increase its profits by 26.0%, 38.2%, and 48.0%, 
respectively. 
From the merchant’s perspective, however, an increase in a platform’s price-bargaining power 
would mean a drop in sales, as a result of the higher deal price. Given that merchants receive a 
fixed payment from the platform, the drop in demand would translate into lower payoffs for the 
merchant. For example, if the platform increases their price-bargaining power by 5%, merchants 
would end up with an 11.3% drop in payoffs on Groupon and 10.7% on LivingSocial. In other 
words, this analysis indicates that merchants benefit substantially from having bargaining power 
when working with platforms. 
Note that in this counterfactual analysis we take the merchant-platform pairs as given and do 
not explicitly account for the possibility that an existing pair may disagree on the new price. 
Nevertheless, the results still inform us on the relative importance of price-bargaining power in 
this empirical setting.    
<Table 10> 
In the second counterfactual analysis, we examine to what extent price-bargaining power 
influences the merchants’ choice of platforms. To answer this question, we first construct a set of 
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hypothetical merchants with certain characteristics that offer a typical deal13. Next, for each 
merchant, we compute its bargaining power on Groupon and on LivingSocial, and then compute 
the implied deal price and likelihood of purchase on each platform. We then increase the 
LivingSocial’s price-bargaining power over the merchant and compute the new equilibrium price 
and purchase likelihood.  
The results are reported in Table 11. The numbers are the percentage differences between 
LivingSocial and Groupon. For example, for a small merchant offering a low-face-value voucher, 
our calculation shows that the deal price on LivingSocial would be lower than that on Groupon by 
9.6%; as a result, the likelihood of the deal being purchased would be higher on LivingSocial by 
32.6%. The gain in purchase likelihood on LivingSocial is higher for a large merchant (34.4%), as 
our supply parameter estimates indicate that the bargaining power difference between platforms is 
higher for larger merchants. With the current low bargaining power, LivingSocial actually offers 
an incentive for merchants to choose them despite their smaller customer base.  
We observe the same pattern for merchants with a higher face value. The purchase likelihood 
on LivingSocial is higher than that on Groupon by 27.6% for a large merchant and 25.5% for a 
smaller one. The gain on LivingSocial due to the pricing advantage is 8.2% (=(27.6%-
25.5%)/25.5%) between a larger and small merchant with a higher face value and 5.5% (=(34.4%-
32.6%)/32.6%); this suggests that we would larger merchants with a high face value would have 
higher incentives to choose LivingSocial than their smaller counterparts, consistent with the 
model-free evidence we described in Section 3.5.  
As we increase LivingSocial’s bargaining power, the pricing advantage that a merchant enjoys 
on LivingSocial diminishes. For example, with a 20% increase and for a small merchant with low 
face value, the price on LivingSocial is only lower than that on Groupon by 7.3% and the purchase 
likelihood is higher by 23.5%. Interestingly, as the LivingSocial’s bargaining power increases, 
merchants’ pricing advantage on the platform also converges for small and large merchants.  
Combining results from the two counterfactual analyses, we find that the lower price-
bargaining power for LivingSocial may have actually helped it grow business. If it is to boost the 
                                                 
13 By “typical”, we assign the sample mean to each deal feature except price and face value.  
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bargaining power, LivingSocial is able to increase its margin and drive up profits; however, the 
higher bargaining power would also make LivingSocial lose its pricing advantage and hence 
become less attractive to merchants, hindering its acquisition of merchants. Those effects make 
bargaining power an interesting and important factor in platform competition.  
<Table 11> 
7 Conclusion 
We study how bargaining affects pricing and competition in a two-sided market. Using a unique 
and comprehensive dataset from US daily deals, we specify a structural model that jointly 
examines consumer behaviors and the strategic interactions between deal platforms and merchants. 
We find that a platform’s size can have two faces: first, a larger customer base attracts merchants, 
which in turn helps grow the customer base even further. Second, a larger platform has higher 
bargaining power in price negotiations, leading to less favorable prices for merchants, which 
motivates certain merchants to choose smaller platforms over which they have more influence on 
price setting. In a nutshell, this paper empirically demonstrates that price bargaining power is an 
important factor to consider in platform competition. When the platform is too big and powerful, 
its strong bargaining power may push away some business partners and hence slow down its 
growth. Hence, the network effect and the bargaining power are two counter-balancing factors to 
shape the growth of a platform. While the network effect has been the study focus of extant 
empirical literatures on platform competition, the price bargaining power has largely been ignored 
or assumed away even when it is present in practice. This research bridges this important gap. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first empirical papers in marketing that 
examine the role of bargaining power in a two-sided market. Due to data limitations, we leave a 
few interesting and important topics for future research. First, we assume in our paper that 
platforms are myopic and bargain with merchants to maximize the joint payoffs from the current 
transaction, regardless of how the outcome may influence future payoffs. In fact, a platform may 
face a tradeoff between current and future payoffs. If it accepts a price more favorable for 
merchants, more merchants may be willing to join that platform rather than its competitors. Due 
to the network effect, this could increase the platform’s customer base and boost profits in the 
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long run. Therefore, if a platform behaves dynamically, it should negotiate a price that maximizes 
the product of the merchant’s current profits and its own future discounted total profits, rather 
than merely its own current profits. Modeling such dynamic decision-making, however, requires a 
longer time horizon of observations on the platform’s pricing decisions and its growth than we 
could manage in this study. Furthermore, by focusing on the current period's payoffs, we generate 
insights on how platforms and merchants internalize price-bargaining power in their strategic 
interactions; this lays a foundation for our follow-up research on platforms’ forward-looking 
decisions. 
Second, a platform could undergo a learning process concerning its own bargaining power as 
it repeatedly transacts with the same merchant. It is reasonable to imagine that, during the first 
transaction, neither party is fully informed about their relative bargaining power; they each take a 
guess. Over time, they use the results of their deal sales to update the estimates of their relative 
bargaining power. A more successful sales history would lead the pair to believe that the merchant 
can make a more credible threat to withdraw and thus have more bargaining power. Furthermore, 
the variation in sales for the same merchant affects the speed of learning. If deals are consistently 
popular or unpopular, the platform and the merchant can update their expectations quickly; with 
a noisy sales history, it would take longer for them to figure out their relative bargaining power.  
Although such learning is plausible, it may not be critical in our setting. During our data-
collection period, less than 10 percent of the merchants offered deals more than twice on the same 
platform. Even when they did, they did not necessarily offer the same deals.14 While there may 
not be much learning in our setting, learning of the bargaining power may play a much more 
important role in other B2B contexts.   
Third, we do not try to pin down the exact factors that determine price-bargaining power. To 
an extent, bargaining ability may depend on the negotiation skills and the incentives behind 
individual negotiators. Unfortunately, the data in our study are not available to address the 
                                                 
14 For example, a salon can offer a deal of “40% off $50 for hair treatment” on one deal platform and “50% 
off $80 for hair treatment” on another platform. It is hard to say whether such deals should be considered 
the same deal. 
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mechanisms of bargaining power. Yet, better understanding the determinants could lead to 
interesting insights concerning how managers can shape market outcomes by influencing their 
bargaining power.  
Lastly, as is true for almost all empirical work, our results may be contingent on the specific 
characteristics of the study setting. In particular, we treat them as neither substitutes nor 
complements. As a result, the direct network effect among merchants is not formally modeled. If 
certain goods and services are indeed substitutes, the platform and merchant need to be mindful 
that consumers may switch their choices if an agreement is not reached. This could be a critical 
modeling aspect in markets with only a few differentiated goods. We look forward to seeing our 
framework extended to such settings. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Deal Characteristics and Sales 
  Platform Mean SD Min Median Max 
Groupon Sales  244.19 885.97 1 90 100,000 
(N=128,749) Price 59.26 61.15 1 39 400 
 
Discount 58.70 12.21 0 53 99 
 
Face value 196.36 317.16 2 100 9,600 
 
Small market 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
 
Medium market 0.32 0.47 0 0 1 
 
Large market 0.50 0.50 0 0 1 
 
January 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
 
February 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
 
March 0.07 0.26 0 0 1 
 
April 0.07 0.26 0 0 1 
 
May 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
 
June 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
 
July 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
 
August 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
 
September 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
 
October 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 
  November 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 
 December 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
LivingSocial Sales  274.41 1,259.82 1 92 94,226 
(N=69,340) Price 48.29 48.11 1 35 400 
 
Discount 57.39 11.67 0 51 100 
 
Face value 136.23 173.55 4 85 5,950 
 
Small market 0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
 
Medium market 0.35 0.48 0 0 1 
 
Large market 0.46 0.50 0 0 1 
 
January 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
 
February 0.07 0.25 0 0 1 
 
March 0.07 0.26 0 0 1 
 
April 0.07 0.26 0 0 1 
 
May 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
 
June 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
 
July 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
 
August 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 
 
September 0.09 0.29 0 0 1 
 
October 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
November 0.10 0.31 0 0 1 
  December 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 
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Table 2: Deal Categories on Platforms 
   
Price Sales 
  N % Mean SD Mean SD 
Groupon       
Beauty 24,657 19.2% 91.7 78.2 135.7 448.5 
Family activities 4,700 3.7% 57.8 66.8 222.2 561.2 
Fitness 8,377 6.5% 48.0 30.3 139.4 199.9 
Goods 14,994 11.6% 40.9 48.1 394.9 1,434.0 
Home and automobile services 16,830 13.1% 65.4 55.4 144.7 485.1 
Life skill classes 7,262 5.6% 69.9 51.3 97.1 206.0 
Live events 6,190 4.8% 29.4 25.5 419.5 2,783.4 
Outdoor activities 9,083 7.1% 67.7 64.1 226.2 476.8 
Personal care 8,838 6.9% 58.9 38.2 151.8 215.3 
Restaurants 20,226 15.7% 22.5 24.0 456.7 535.2 
Sports 3,371 2.6% 55.1 53.2 224.3 275.2 
Travel 4,221 3.3% 121.9 94.4 197.8 334.5 
LivingSocial 
      Beauty 12,562 18.1% 67.9 54.9 144.4 992.0 
Family activities 7,927 11.4% 56.9 52.1 150.1 879.9 
Fitness 7,524 10.9% 36.5 22.4 123.1 225.1 
Goods 3,292 4.8% 31.9 50.8 1,577.1 26,580.4 
Home and automobile services 9,597 13.8% 60.9 51.5 163.2 667.5 
Life skill classes 3,893 5.6% 54.0 46.5 152.2 274.9 
Live events 4,148 6.0% 36.0 39.7 367.0 967.6 
Outdoor activities 3,270 4.7% 56.1 59.1 460.6 1,079.0 
Personal care 4,288 6.2% 51.0 30.9 179.7 273.9 
Restaurants 10,763 15.5% 20.3 28.2 451.0 665.3 
Sports 1,249 1.8% 42.5 40.7 267.0 419.2 
Travel 827 1.2% 56.0 69.2 439.4 793.8 
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Table 3: Platform Shares by Month and Census region 
 Groupon only LivingSocial only Multi-homing 
User distribution across platform choices per month  
January  70.9% 14.7% 14.4% 
February  54.6% 16.3% 13.4% 
March 57.9% 19.2% 15.5% 
April 54.6% 21.6% 15.1% 
May 55.6% 24.2% 16.0% 
June 56.1% 20.2% 15.5% 
July 60.3% 22.5% 15.4% 
August 57.8% 20.1% 14.6% 
September 46.2% 20.5% 14.6% 
October 50.5% 21.4% 14.4% 
November 45.8% 26.5% 13.1% 
December 45.3% 21.4% 13.4% 
Average  54.6% 20.7% 14.6% 
User distribution across platform choices per region  
region 1: New England 5.3% 11.1% 10.4% 
region 2: Mid-Atlantic 15.4% 13.9% 12.5% 
region 3: East North Central 15.5% 11.1% 12.5% 
region 4: West North Central 6.1% 4.2% 6.3% 
region 5: South Atlantic 23.0% 19.4% 14.6% 
region 6: East South Central 2.3% 5.6% 6.3% 
region 7: West South Central 7.7% 8.3% 12.5% 
region 8: Mountain 6.4% 9.7% 12.5% 
region 9: Pacific 18.2% 16.7% 12.5% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Note: The number of unique visitors for Groupon, LivingSocial, and both sites were acquired from Compete, 
Inc. The numbers in the top panel are the percentages of active users in each month of 2012. The numbers 
in the bottom panel are the percentages of active users across US census regions for each platform choice. 
We acquired these data from comScore, Inc.  
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Table 4: Average Deal Prices on Groupon and LivingSocial 
 
Platform N Mean SD Min Max 2-sample t test 
All deals Groupon 128,749 59.3 61.1 1 400 <0.001 
LivingSocial 69,340 48.3 48.1 1 400 
Deals with a low face 
value 
Groupon 28,561 13.5 4.4 1 40 <0.001 
LivingSocial 18,925 12.4 4.9 1 40 
Deals with a medium 
face value 
Groupon 75,986 48.3 25.6 6 205 0.005 
LivingSocial 42,254 47.6 24.9 5 250 
Deals with a high 
face value 
Groupon 24,202 147.7 84.6 10 400 
<0.001 
LivingSocial 8,161 135.0 76.8 10 400 
Note: Low face value is less than $45, medium value is between $45 and $220, and high face value is higher 
than $220. 
 
Table 5: Merchant Characteristics on Groupon and LivingSocial 
  
Groupon  LivingSocial 2-sample t 
test 
  
N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Merchant 
Size 
Low to medium 
face value 7,900 23.6 48.5 5,039 18.4 42.8 0.002 
High face  
value 3,118 12.6 30.8 1,211 15.1 42.2 <0.001 
Chain 
Low to medium 
face value 8,007 0.12 0.33 5,084 0.08 0.27 <0.001 
High face  
value 3,124 0.07 0.26 1,223 0.09 0.29 0.052 
Note: The variables merchant size and chain measure the number of employees per merchant and whether it 
belongs to a chain, respectively. Currently, the merchant-level dataset has 17,470 observations. The smaller 
sample size is due to data-processing constraints; we are working on data cleaning and matching to increase 
the sample size.  
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Table 6: Linear Parameter Estimates for Deal Demand 
 
(1) Homogeneous logit 
without IV 
(2) Homogeneous logit 
with IV 
(3) Random-coefficient 
logit with IV 
Variable Est SE Est SE Est SE 
Price -0.834*** 0.005 -2.875*** 0.061 -3.952*** 0.064 
Face value  0.013*** 0.002  0.296*** 0.012  0.311*** 0.013 
Beauty  0.064*** 0.012  0.209*** 0.016  0.168*** 0.017 
Family activities -0.462*** 0.016 -0.755*** 0.025 -0.811*** 0.026 
Fitness -0.070*** 0.015 -0.537*** 0.022 -0.513*** 0.023 
Goods -1.378*** 0.015 -2.353*** 0.035 -2.280*** 0.037 
Life skill class -0.143*** 0.017 -0.215*** 0.023 -0.240*** 0.023 
Live events -0.036** 0.018 -1.125*** 0.040 -1.177*** 0.042 
Outdoor activities  0.397*** 0.016  0.297*** 0.022  0.273*** 0.024 
Personal  0.458*** 0.016  0.451*** 0.017  0.511*** 0.018 
Restaurants  0.623*** 0.014 -1.224*** 0.054 -1.314*** 0.057 
Sports  0.410*** 0.024  0.047  0.032  0.083** 0.034 
Travel -0.642*** 0.023  0.020  0.036  0.182*** 0.038 
Market medium  1.559*** 0.008  1.411*** 0.011  1.634*** 0.011 
Market small  2.340*** 0.009  2.108*** 0.014  2.648*** 0.015 
January -0.207*** 0.019 -0.281*** 0.024 -0.304*** 0.026 
March -0.119*** 0.018 -0.149*** 0.023 -0.106*** 0.024 
April -0.219*** 0.018 -0.227*** 0.023 -0.205*** 0.025 
May -0.314*** 0.018 -0.248*** 0.023 -0.224*** 0.024 
June -0.294*** 0.018 -0.244*** 0.023 -0.224*** 0.024 
July -0.453*** 0.018 -0.428*** 0.023 -0.416*** 0.024 
August -0.397*** 0.017 -0.378*** 0.023 -0.338*** 0.024 
September -0.173*** 0.017 -0.176*** 0.022 -0.159*** 0.024 
October -0.475*** 0.017 -0.451*** 0.022 -0.432*** 0.023 
November -0.590*** 0.017 -0.532*** 0.022 -0.504*** 0.024 
December -0.604*** 0.017 -0.508*** 0.023 -0.468*** 0.024 
N 198,089 198,089 198,089 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
Table 7: Nonlinear Parameter Estimates for Deal Demand 
 
p   Income Household size Age 
Coefficient Est SE Est SE Est SE Est SE 
Intercept 0.943*** 0.011 -0.459*** 0.088 -0.980*** 0.194 0.497*** 0.059 
Price 0.354*** 0.004  0.456*** 0.023  0.587*** 0.047 0.388*** 0.015 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
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Table 8: Parameter Estimates for Platform Choices 
Variables  Est SE 
Beauty 0.0048*** 0.0007 
Family activities 0.0016*** 0.0004 
Fitness 0.0003  0.0005 
Goods 0.0003  0.0004 
Home and automobile services 0.0020*** 0.0006 
Life skill classes 0.0013*** 0.0004 
Live events 0.0006  0.0004 
Outdoor activities 0.0002  0.0004 
Personal care 0.0001  0.0005 
Restaurants 0.0108*** 0.0008 
Sports 0.0009*** 0.0003 
Travel 0.0009*** 0.0003 
February -0.0963*** 0.0044 
March 0.0397*** 0.0059 
April 0.0551*** 0.0068 
May 0.1251*** 0.0074 
June 0.0539*** 0.0078 
July 0.1397*** 0.0079 
August 0.0706*** 0.0078 
September -0.0129* 0.0074 
October 0.0297*** 0.0068 
November 0.0401*** 0.0059 
December -0.0290*** 0.0044 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
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Table 9: Supply Parameter Estimates  
Parameter Est SE 
Intercept  2.363*** 0.009 
Groupon -1.444*** 0.010 
Merchant size  0.016** 0.006 
Merchant size X Groupon -0.020** 0.010 
Chain  0.638*** 0.008 
Chain X Groupon -0.0539*** 0.010 
Merchant annual sales  0.208*** 0.017 
Voucher face value   0.046*** 0.012 
k   
  Groupon -0.139*** 0.010 
Beauty  0.293*** 0.007 
Family activities  0.340*** 0.004 
Fitness  0.330*** 0.010 
Goods  0.349*** 0.004 
Home and automobile services  0.324*** 0.015 
Life skill classes  0.338*** 0.003 
Live events  0.343*** 0.002 
Outdoor activities  0.342*** 0.002 
Personal care  0.339*** 0.003 
Restaurants  0.341*** 0.006 
Sports  0.344*** 0.009 
Travel  0.350*** 0.004 
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.10 
Note: Estimates are from a subset of observations (N=17,470) for which we have an exact match of 
merchant names with the OneSource dataset. As calculating the disagreement payoffs is very computational 
intensive, using a sub-sample helps ease the computation burden.  
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Table 10: Counterfactual Results on Price and Sales Changes 
 
5% Increase in 
bargaining power 
10% Increase in 
bargaining power 
20% Increase in 
bargaining power 
50% Increase in 
bargaining power 
% changes in Groupon LivingSocial Groupon LivingSocial Groupon LivingSocial Groupon LivingSocial 
Price 4.4 4.3 8.5 8.1 15.8 14.9 34.6 29.8 
Demand -11.3 -10.7 -20.1 -19.1 -33.1 -31.3 -55.5 -50.6 
Profits 2.3 15.5 3.1 26.0 3.4 38.2 13.0 48.0 
Note: When computing the counterfactual price and demand with a 5% increase in Groupon’s bargaining power, we take LivingSocial’s 
bargaining power as given. The same is done for the calculation for LivingSocial. The numbers are percentage changes relative to the value with 
the current true bargaining power. 
 
Table 11: Counterfactual Results on Difference between Platforms 
 
Face value 
Merchant 
size 
LivingSocial bargaining power 
True 10% increase 20% increase 40% increase 
Price 
Low 
Small -9.6% -8.5% -7.3% -4.8% 
Large -10.1% -9.0% -7.8% -5.4% 
High 
Small -7.8% -6.7% -5.6% -3.4% 
Large -8.2% -7.1% -6.1% -3.9% 
Purchase 
likelihood 
Low Small 32.6% 28.0% 23.5% 14.8% Large 34.4% 29.9% 25.5% 16.9% 
High 
Small 25.5% 21.5% 17.6% 10.0% 
Large 27.6% 23.0% 19.1% 11.7% 
Note:  Deal share is the estimated likelihood of purchase for each deal. Small and large merchants correspond to those with 2 and 40 employees, 
respectively. Similarly, low and high face values are defined according to the 25% and 75% percentiles of the variable, which correspond to $58 and 
$173, respectively. The numbers are the percentage differences compared to Groupon values. For example, for a typical small merchant offering a low-
face-value voucher, its price on LivingSocial is lower than that on Groupon by 9.6% and the likelihood of purchase is higher by 32.6%.  
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Figure 1: Illustration of Data Components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Data components related to consumers and platforms are for year 2012. Merchants’ characteristics are 
retrieved from the OneSource database in 2015. We assume that the characteristics of interest—number of 
employees and whether a merchant belongs to a chain or is independent—are the same between 2012 and 
2015. 
Figure 2: Quantity and Sales of Deals on Platforms
 
Note: The bars correspond to the number of deals by category for Groupon (“GR”) and LivingSocial 
(“LS”).  The lines depict the average sales quantity per category on each platform.  
 
 
Characteristics 
such as number 
of employees and 
chain versus 
independent  
 
Source: OneSource 
 
 
 
(1) Deal data 
including sales 
quantity, price, 
category, and market  
Source: YipitData 
 
(2) Platform market 
shares 
Sources: Compete; comScore 
 
 
Empirical 
distributions for 
individual 
characteristics 
 
Source: US Current 
Population Survey 
 
Consumers Platforms Merchants 
49 
 
Figure 3: Average Lerner Index by Merchant Size and Deal Tier 
 
Note: We plot the Lerner index using a proprietary dataset from one of the two deal sites. The height of the 
bar corresponds to the average index and the error bars indicate one standard deviation above and below 
the mean. The left panel depicts the average index by merchant type: small, mid-sized, and large. The right 
panel presents the average index by deal quality; the higher the tier, the better the perceived quality. 
 
Figure 4: Histogram of Platforms’ Relative Price-bargaining Power 
 
 
 
N Mean SD Min Max 
Groupon 9,865 0.61 0.18 0.09 0.99 
LivingSocial 4,671 0.36 0.10 0.09 0.86 
Note: The table summarizes the estimated relative bargaining power for Groupon and LivingSocial. 
